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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee Big-D Construction Corporation ("Big-D") agrees with the Statement of 
Jurisdiction contained in Appellant Marlene Begaye's principal brief. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
Did Judge Hilder properly grant summary judgment to Big-D because there was no 
evidence that Big-D, the general contractor, retained control over the subcontractor's 
manner and method of supporting the wall that collapsed on Michael Begaye? 
This issue was preserved at R. 227-29. The appellate court reviews the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment for correctness. Machock v. Fink, 137 P.3d 779, 782 
(Utah 2006). There are no statutes that are determinative of this issue. 
III. INTRODUCTION 
The construction project where Michael Begaye was killed was not atypical from 
many other large-scale construction projects in how it was structured and how it operated. 
The project owner contracted with an experienced industrial general contractor, Big-D, to 
construct a building at the University of Utah. Like the typical general contractor, Big-D 
had the skills to manage and supervise the project; in short, it was Big-D's job to make 
sure the structure was built. Big-D turned to subcontractors with the expertise to handle 
specific parts of the project. These subcontractors, such as Mr. Begaye's employer 
Preferred, knew how to complete their assignment from start to finish. They coordinated 
with Big-D frequently to make sure the overall project progressed in the most efficient 
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way, but they were the masters of their day-to-day work on the project. They supervised 
their crews, told them what to do and how to do it, and provided them the tools and 
equipment needed to do their job. They had control over their workers and how their 
workers performed their jobs. 
This was not the type of construction project where Big-D insinuated itself into the 
details of Preferred's work. It did not control the manner and method of Preferred's 
work, and more importantly, it was not controlling how Preferred erected the wall at the 
time Mr. Begaye was killed. That was Preferred's job. Preferred was the expert on how 
to do it. 
Big-D cannot be liable to Mrs. Begaye in its capacity as the general contractor on 
the project unless Big-D effectively became Mr. Begaye's employer that day and directed 
the manner and method of bracing the wall that fell on him. Because that did not happen, 
Mrs. Begaye tries on appeal to turn Big-D's normal activities as a general contractor into 
unique and unusual exertions of control over Preferred's work. She argues that Big-D's 
powers to ensure overall safety on the project and to move the project forward, which are 
standard and necessary powers of a general contractor on a large project, trigger the 
exception to the rule that general contractors are not liable for injuries to a subcon-
tractor's employee. These are arguments that Utah courts and courts in other jurisdictions 
have previously considered and rejected. This is not one of those rare cases where the 
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retained control exception to the rule of non-liability applies. Judge Hilder appropriately 
granted summary judgment to Big-D, and this Court should affirm that ruling. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE, PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
A. Statement of Facts 
Marlene Begaye, widow of Michael Begaye, filed a wrongful death lawsuit after 
her husband Michael Begaye was killed while working on a construction site in Salt Lake 
City in March 2004. (R. 1-6). Big-D was the general contractor on a construction 
project to build the Health Sciences Education Building at the University of Utah. 
(R. 539). Big-D hired Preferred Steel, Inc. ("Preferred") as the concrete and masonry 
subcontractor. (R. 822). Michael Begaye was employed by Preferred. (R. 2). 
The bid document between Big-D and Preferred described Preferred5 s scope of 
work in part as "furnishing and installing reinforcing steel and accessories for cast in place 
concrete and furnishing reinforcing steel for unit masonry . . . ." (R. 822). Preferred 
agreed to provide "[a]ll labor, materials, and equipment for complete installation of [the] 
trade . . ." and to be responsible for "calling for inspections related to [its] trade." 
(R. 822). Moreover, Preferred agreed in the Subcontract Agreement to provide a safe 
workplace for its employees: 
At all times while any of your employees, agents or subcontractors are on the 
Owner's premises, you are solely responsible for providing them with a safe 
workplace of employment, and you shall inspect all areas where they may 
work and promptly take action to correct conditions which are or may 
become unsafe. 
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(R. 831). Preferred also promised to adhere "to all safety regulations, including the 
applicable Occupational Safety & Health Act and all regulations adopted thereunder 
(R. 831). 
On March 1, 2004, Preferred5s foreman Todd Jex asked Big-D concrete super-
intendent Kevin Bums if the Preferred crew could begin building the inside face of a rebar 
wall shown on plans as Wall 39. (R. 192). Mr. Jex was a journeyman ironworker with 
twenty years experience doing rebar work. (R. 935). 
This was not a situation where Mr. Bums or anyone else from Big-D directed or 
instructed Preferred to begin building Wall 39, and contrary to Mrs. Begaye's charac-
terization, Big-D did not "send" Preferred5s employees to work on Wall 39. (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 2). Rather, Mr. Jex "wanted to make work for his guys,55 and he asked Mr. Bums 
if his crew could "tie up55 the wall. (R. 193). Mr. Bums testified as follows: 
A: 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
As I understand it, before Preferred went to work on this wall they conferred 
with you? Wall number 39, the wall that collapsed. 
Correct. 
And you told them to go to work on wall number 39 next? 
I did not. 
What did you tell them? 
He asked. 
(R. 192). 
Mr. Bums told Mr. Jex that his crew could "go ahead55 and build the wall. (R. 193). 
Mr. Jex, along with three other Preferred employees including Mr. Begaye, began building 
the wall. (R. 193). 
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Preferred had complete autonomy and discretion over how it completed the wall. 
Mr. Jex testified as follows: 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A 
Q 
A: 
Q 
Who was your primary contact person with Big-D? 
Mine was Kevin, Kevin Burns. 
Todd, did Kevin ever give you directions as to the methods you used 
to put up the rebar? 
No. Our job was pretty basic. 
Can you recall any instance during the three months or so before this 
accident where Kevin gave you a specific instruction about the way to 
do your work? 
No, he didn't, no. 
Did anybody else from Big-D give you that kind of instruction? 
No. 
Was there someone from Big-D who was assigned to stay with your 
crew and watch what your crew was doing? 
No. 
(R. 193, 213-14). One of the Preferred employees, Tony Whitaker, confirmed that 
Preferred put up the wall that day without any interference or suggestions from anyone 
else about how to do it: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
(R. 194,219). 
Now in terms of the time period that you and the other men were 
working on this wall, can you testify as to whether or not anyone who 
was working for Big-D came over and told you something about how 
to be doing what you were doing? 
No. 
No one did? 
Nobody. 
As it put up the wall, the Preferred crew supported the wall by using bracing. Big-
D was not involved in Preferred's decision to use bracing or in how Preferred used the 
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bracing; "[t]hey had no say-so in what we did." (R. 194, 222). Mr. Jex elaborated by 
testifying: 
Q: Now, Todd, this way that you were doing the bracing, is that 
something that Big-D told you to do that way? 
A: No. That's what we have done for years. 
Q: Are you aware of anybody from Big-D even being aware of how you 
had braced this particular wall as you were putting it up? 
A: Not that I'm aware of. 
(R. 194, 215). Big-D did not tell them how to brace, where to tie off the rebar, whether 
to anchor the wall with guy wiring, or what equipment to use as they were putting up the 
wall. (R. 195-96,216). 
The manner and method of putting up Wall 39 was exclusively Preferred's 
decision, as Mr. Jex elaborated: 
Q: Now this decision, Todd, to go forward with this wall under the 
circumstances without forms in place, without guy wires and by using 
the braces only, who made that judgment? 
A: I would say probably myself and then talking to everybody. 
Q: Talking to your crew? 
A: Right. 
Q: Is that a decision that you depended on in any way for Big-D to make 
for you? 
A: No. That's what I decided we would do. 
Q: If you had felt that you did not want to go forward with that work 
without first having the forms in place, could you have made that 
choice . . . . If you felt like you wanted to wait until forms were in 
place to do that wall, could you have made that choice? 
A: Yes. 
(R. 196,216). 
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The fact that Preferred used bracing as the way to support Wall 39 was not unusual; 
according to Mr. Jex, it was "just common practice. We had done some other walls on the 
other end this way also." (R. 933). He further testified: 
Q: So from your perspective as of the time this happened was there 
anything unusual about the work situation as of the time of the 
accident? 
A: No. We all felt pretty good about it and it was the last bar we was 
going to put up for the day and go on the next day." 
(R. 933). Likewise, Tim Elliot, one of the iron workers employed by Preferred to work on 
Wall 39, stated that Preferred supported the walls on the project by bracing rather than by 
forms u[m]ost of the time, quite a bit." (R. 933). 
The Preferred employees were in control of the specific safety precautions they 
took while building Wall 39. Mr. Elliot testified: 
Q: When Big-D runs a job site, Big D controls what happens . . . 
A: As far as scheduling? 
Q: Sure. 
A: Well, yeah, they tell us when they want something done. 
Q: They control the safety? 
A: Not really. They don't really have too much control over us. They 
tell us when they want this wall built and this wall built. 
Q: Then you go build it. 
A: Uh-huh (affirmative). Yes. 
(R. 223). Mr. Burns confirmed that each employer is in charge of keeping its own 
employees safe: "Preferred takes care of their own and I take care of my own." (R. 196, 
206). 
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As the Preferred crew was putting up the wall, the bracing broke, causing the wall 
to collapse. (R. 208-10). The collapse threw Mr. Begaye to the ground, and he was killed. 
(R. 2). 
B. Procedural History and Disposition Below 
Mrs. Begaye filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Big-D in October 2004, and 
after more than a year of discovery, Big-D moved for summary judgment on the basis that 
Big-D did not exert control over the injury-causing aspect of Preferred5 s work. (R. 1-6, 
227-29). Mrs. Begaye responded with a request to conduct more discovery pursuant to 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). (R. 230-33). During the hearing on Mrs. Begaye's 
Rule 56(f) motion, her counsel conceded that their argument against summary judgment 
largely consisted of a claim that the wall was not constructed safely as opposed to a claim 
that Big-D controlled the actual construction of the wall. (R. 1072, p. 22). Big-D agreed 
at the hearing to permit Mrs. Begaye to conduct the limited discovery she wished to 
conduct before Judge Hilder ruled on the motion for summary judgment. (R. 1072, pp. 30-
31). 
After Mrs. Begaye completed this discovery, she opposed Big-D's motion for 
summary judgment and filed her own motion for partial summary judgment on the basis 
that Big-D owed Mr. Begaye a duty of safety as a matter of law. (R. 508-917). Judge 
Hilder held oral argument on the parties' motions in May 2006. (R. 1073). Judge Hilder 
granted Big-D's motion, noting that Mrs. Begaye's arguments regarding overall safety and 
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job sequencing had nothing to do with whether Big-D controlled the manner and method 
of putting up the wall. (R. 1073, p. 9). Judge Hilder explained his ruling as follows: 
[T]he case law has kept it pretty narrow. It's about operative details, it's 
about the control over the method, the mode of the actual task. The 
dilemma, I think, and I think that it's a strong policy dilemma, is we can't 
get into a situation where an owner or a general who takes seriously safety 
obligations, which it is very clear Big-D did, is then penalized because they 
don't supervise every part of the work unless they're controlling the work. 
And it seems to me that the facts are undisputed that no matter what else 
Big-D did, it didn't tell the sub how to build the wall, how to brace the wall. 
(R. 1073, p. 4). This appeal ensued. (R. 987-88). 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT A: Utah law is crystal-clear that a general contractor like Big-D cannot be 
liable for the workplace injury of a subcontractor's employee unless the general contractor 
exercised affirmative control over the injury-causing aspect of the subcontractor's work. 
Utah courts have narrowly construed the exception to Restatement ( Second) of Torts § 
414, under which a general contractor can be liable if he retained control over the 
subcontractor's work. 
It is undisputed that Big-D did not tell Preferred to support Wall 39 by using 
bracing and that Big-D did not actively participate in the bracing of Wall 39. Indeed, 
while Mrs. Begaye faults Big-D on appeal for not stopping what she claims was an unwise 
decision on Preferred's part to support the wall with bracing, this simply bolsters the 
critical point that Big-D was not directing Preferred's manner and method of erecting the 
wall. Judge Hilder correctly focused on the facts that were relevant to the pertinent legal 
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inquiry of control over the manner and method, and he appropriately granted summary 
judgment to Big-D. 
POINT B: The panoply of irrelevant facts that Mrs. Begaye recites to support her 
position that summary judgment should be reversed strays far from the legal question of 
whether Big-D retained control over the injury-causing aspect of Preferred's work. These 
immaterial facts fall into two categories: facts regarding Big-D's scheduling and 
sequencing of the project to move it forward, and facts regarding Big-D's general 
supervisory role over project safety. Courts have accurately recognized that these powers 
of a general contractor are normal and necessary, and that they do not mean the general 
contractor is micro-managing the details of a subcontractor's work. This Court should not 
be distracted by evidence that has nothing to do with whether Big-D controlled the manner 
and method of bracing Wall 39. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. Big-D Cannot Be Held Liable Under Utah Law to a Subcontractor's 
Employee Where Big-D Did Not Direct the Injury-Causing Aspect of the 
Subcontractor's Work. 
1. UTAH HAS A LONG HISTORY OF LIMITING A 
GENERAL CONTRACTOR'S LIABILITY TO UNIQUE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE 
INJURY-CAUSING WORK. 
While many legal practitioners consider Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 979 P.2d 
322, to be the elucidating Utah case regarding the retained control doctrine, there are two 
state court cases preceding it where the Utah Supreme Court recognized the concept that a 
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general contractor or owner should not be responsible for a workplace injury unless it 
controlled and directed the injury-causing work. In Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 
408 (1914), a subcontractor's employee was injured while working on a tunnel. He sued a 
number of parties, including the general contractor, Snake Creek Mining & Tunnel 
Company ("Snake Creek"). At trial, the court granted Snake Creek's motion for directed 
verdict because it had no duty to protect the employee from the negligence of its subcon-
tractors. Dayton, 148 P. at 409. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment 
even though Snake Creek could require subcontractors to reinforce portions of the tunnel 
by using the method it saw as most appropriate, could alter the subcontractors' work at its 
discretion, could require subcontractors to correct insufficient work, could demand that 
subcontractors fire their employees if it showed reasonable cause, and provided much of 
the equipment for the project. Id. at 410-11. The court discounted these circumstances 
because the general contractor could only be responsible for the employee's injury where it 
could 
direct or control the work, not only with respect to results, but also with 
reference to methods of procedure or means by which the result was to be 
accomplished, where the will and discretion of the [subcontractor as to the 
time and manner of doing the work or the means and methods of accom-
plishing the result were subordinate and subject to that of [the general 
contractor]. 
Id. at 411. 
In Gleason v. Salt Lake City et ai9 94 Utah 1, 74 P.2d 1225 (1937), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that a store that had arranged to have the Salt Lake City Fire 
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Department pump its flooded elevator shaft was not liable for injuries the plaintiff sus-
tained when she tripped over the Fire Department's hose. Gleason, 74 P.2d 1225, 1227. 
The court agreed that the Fire Department negligently failed to warn pedestrians of the 
hose but refused to assign liability to the store because the store had no control over the 
Fire Department's work. Id. at 1228. The court restricted "the right to control the manner 
and means" of the work to the injury-causing event — "the operations of pumping." Id. at 
1228. Mrs. Begaye acknowledges those early Utah cases on appeal but ignores that the 
courts refused to impose liability on the contractor or owner despite their control over the 
workplace in general. There was no evidence in those cases, as there is no evidence here, 
that the general contractor "gave any instructions or directions respecting the work or the 
manner in which it should be done." Id. at 1227. 
Mrs. Begaye similarly approaches Thompson v. Jess and this Court's adoption of 
the retained control doctrine in that case with blinders. She claims that Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 414 "does not limit the application of liability at common law, it 
expands it." (Appellant's Brief, p. 13). In reality, § 414 serves as an exception to the 
"general common law rule that 'the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for 
physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor of his servants.'" 
Thompson, 979 P.2d at 325. The exception set forth in § 414, the retained control 
doctrine, "is a narrow theory of liability applicable in unique circumstances where an 
employer of an independent contractor exercises enough control over the contracted work 
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to give rise to a limited duty of care . . . ." Id. at 326. She also mischaracterizes the 
parameters of the doctrine, vaguely alleging that a general contractor need only exercise 
"some" control before it becomes liable for the injury. (Appellant's Brief, p. 13). 
Actually, the comment she cites explains that "some degree of control over the manner in 
which the work is done" is needed to impose liability, meaning that 
[i]t is not enough that he has merely a general right to order the work 
stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make 
suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or 
to prescribe alterations or deviations. Such a general right is usually 
reserved to employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is controlled 
as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail. 
Id. at 327, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 cmt. c. The court equated 
"retained control" with "active participation," meaning that "a principal employer must 
have exercised affirmative control over the method or operative detail of that work." Id. 
at 327. Thus, a premises owner who asked a contractor to erect a steel pipe was not liable 
when a worker was injured during the erection because the owner did not tell the 
contractor how to erect the pipe; rather, the contractor chose a technique for lifting the 
pipe, and the worker was injured in that process. The worker was not injured because the 
owner directed the employer to erect the pipe, but because the employer chose an unsafe 
method. Id. at 328. 
Utah courts have reaffirmed the narrowness of the retained control doctrine since 
Thompson. The case of Smith v. Hales & Warner Constr., Inc., 2005 UT App. 38, 107 
P.3d 701, involved the strikingly similar situation where three men employed by a 
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subcontractor were building a wall. During construction, the wall collapsed, killing one of 
the men. The district court granted summary judgment for the general contractor. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that the general contractor did not actively participate in 
the subcontractor's work. The court noted that 
[o]ther than generally overseeing the work performed by various 
subcontractors, there is no evidence Mr. Egbert trained or instructed 
Decedent about how to build or position the wall frames in place . . . . 
Id. at 705. 
The Utah Court of Appeals reiterated the notion that a general contractor's 
supervisory responsibilities do not create liability, and that something like training the 
subcontractor's employee on how to do his job would be necessary to create the requisite 
control, in Martinez v. Jacobsen Constr. Co., Inc., 2005 UT App. 136 (unpublished 
opinion) (attached at Addendum A). The court's analysis merits quotation at length 
because it addresses Mrs. Begaye's contention that Big-D's contractual assumption over 
general workplace safety somehow meant that it was directing Mr. Begaye how to erect 
Wall 39: 
Plaintiff points to Defendant's directives to [subcontractors] Steel Deck 
Erectors and Truco regarding fall protection, Defendant's safety inspections 
and checklists, and Defendant's project manager's and superintendent's 
acknowledgement of responsibility to look for and correct dangerous 
working conditions, Defendant's monitoring of wind and weather, and 
Defendant's imposition of overtime. Though these factors, taken together, 
suggest a general supervisory role by Defendant, they do not rise to the level 
of control over the "method or operative detail of the injury-causing activity" 
necessary to impose liability. Indeed, it is undisputed that Defendant did not 
train Plaintiff and other steel workers on how to do their jobs. In particular, 
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Defendant did not supervise or train Plaintiff and other steel workers on how 
to install the tie-off system. Rather, Defendant simply required its subcon-
tractors to perform their work safely and in compliance with the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration requirements. "This 
amounted merely to control over the desired result, which is insufficient to 
come within the retained control doctrine." Thompson, 1999 UT 22 at f 24. 
The Utah appellate courts have not encountered a situation where the narrow 
retained control exception to the general rule of non-liability would apply. A general 
contractor would have to insinuate itself actively into a subcontractor's work in order to 
retain the requisite level of control. That clearly did not happen with Big-D and Preferred. 
2. IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT BIG-D DID NOT DIRECT 
PREFERRED ON HOW TO SUPPORT WALL 39. 
Big-D simply gave permission to Preferred to achieve a result on the day of the 
accident. Preferred asked if it could build Wall 39, and Big-D told it to go ahead. 
Preferred's job was "pretty basic," and it knew how to do the job. Preferred did not need 
anyone from Big-D to watch over and give directions as it was building the wall, and no 
one from Big-D purported to do this. Importantly, it was up to Preferred to decide how to 
support Wall 39. If it wanted to use bracing or forms or guy wiring, that was its decision, 
and it did not need to obtain approval or permission from Big-D beforehand. 
The wall collapsed because the bracing broke, and Big-D had no control over this. 
Big-D did not actively participate in bracing the wall. It was not helping Preferred's crew 
put up the wall, and it was not telling the crew how to do it. Mrs. Begaye does not claim, 
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as she cannot, that Big-D actively directed the manner and method by which Preferred 
chose to brace Wall 39. Summary judgment should therefore be affirmed. 
3. BIG-D IS NOT LIABLE UNDER ANY OTHER RESTATEMENT 
SECTION. 
Mrs. Begaye mentions in passing that if Big-D is not liable under the retained 
control doctrine, its "involvement in the safety aspects over the course of the project also 
made Big-D liable under either §§ 323 'Negligent Performance Of Undertaking To Render 
Services' or 324A 'Liability To Third Person For Negligent Performance Of Undertaking' 
. . . ." (Appellant's Brief, p. 19 n.l). She does not set forth any facts or analysis 
supporting the use of either of these sections. She did not brief this argument to the 
district court but relegated it to the same fleeting footnote she gives it on appeal. This 
Court should not seriously consider any argument on appeal that Mrs. Begaye did not 
seriously pursue below. Midvale City Corp. v. Halton, 73 P.3d 334, 339 (Utah 2003). 
B. Big-D's Control Over Sequencing and Workplace Safety Do Not 
Equate to Control Over the Manner and Method of Preferred's 
Bracing of Wall 39. 
The fact that Big-D, as a general contractor, had the ability to control and direct 
certain things on the construction project is not surprising or unusual. A general 
contractor is in charge of making sure the project gets finished, and it must have 
concomitant powers to achieve this. If these powers were enough to impose liability on 
general contractors, they would always be legally responsible for workplace injuries. 
Mrs. Begaye points to various abilities that Big-D exercised during the project, but they 
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are all irrelevant because none of them has to do with control over Preferred's method of 
bracing Wall 39 on the day of the accident. 
1. FACTS INVOLVING CONTROL OVER SEQUENCING DO NOT 
CREATE A DUTY OWED BY A GENERAL CONTRACTOR TO 
A SUBCONTRACTOR'S EMPLOYEE. 
Mrs. Begaye acknowledges that Big-D acted in the typical capacity of a general 
contractor by retaining control "over workflow, timing and sequencing," as well as 
"direction over subcontractors to coordinate and arrange the timing of tasks." Big-D 
superintendent Kevin Burns could tell subcontractors "where to go next," and he acceded 
to Preferred foreman Todd Jex's request that his crew work on Wall 39 because that was 
"where they would be headed next." (Appellant's Brief, pp. 2, 4-5). Indeed, part of any 
general contractor's role is to schedule and coordinate the work of subcontractors, as well 
as to direct them to the next task. Big-D's authority to do so does nothing to imply that 
Big-D affirmatively participated in the operative detail of Preferred's work on Wall 39 on 
March 1,2004. 
It is also true that "construction of the walls represented a cooperative effort 
between Big-D and Preferred." (Appellant's Brief, p. 2). Every part of the construction 
project called for cooperation between Big-D and the subcontractors, and this is common 
and necessary in the construction industry. Again, this does not mean that Big-D 
insinuated itself into the method by which Preferred built Wall 39. Mrs. Begaye claims, 
however, that because Preferred started building it without a form in place, Big-D allowed 
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Preferred to build the wall in a way that "deviated from the sequencing and workflow set 
forth by Big-D's own schedule." (Appellant's Brief, p. 2). First, whether deviations in 
workflow occurred has nothing to do with whether Big-D controlled Preferred5 s work. 
Second, walls had been erected on the project prior to March 1, 2004, without forms in 
place, so Preferred5 s method of building the wall was not unusual or unprecedented. 
The Utah Court of Appeals explained in Martinez that a general contractor 
exercising its general supervisory role is not the same as exercising affirmative control 
over a particular aspect of a subcontractor's work. Other courts agree that control over 
sequencing work does not impose liability on the general contractor for workplace injuries. 
In Piper v. Jerry's Homes, Inc., 671 N.W.2d 531 (Iowa App. 2003), the court concluded 
that a general contractor was not liable to a subcontractor's employee who fell through an 
unguarded stairwell because he coordinated the work performed by the subcontractors and 
check on their progress. The court in Martinez v. Asarco Inc., 918 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 
1990), accepted plaintiffs points that the general contractor controlled commencement of 
the subcontractor's work, scheduled the work, and determined when the work would end; 
the court nonetheless granted summary judgment for the general contractor because 
all of the asserted Asarco actions concern control over only the sequence of 
the work. Such control is insufficient to establish liability under section 414 
as applied by Arizona courts. 
Martinez, 918 F.2d at 1475; see also Sullins v. Third and Catalina Constructions 
Partnership, 602 P.2d 495, 500 (Ariz. App. 1979) ("The right to program or direct the 
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sequence of the work . . . does not give defendant the right to control the method or 
manner of doing the work.") 
Big-D is not responsible for Mr. Begaye's death merely because it moved the 
project along and allowed Preferred to build Wall 39 on the day of the accident. It means 
only that Big-D had a say in when Preferred put up the wall, but Big-D did not participate 
in the manner and method of putting up the wall. 
2. FACTS INVOLVING CONTROL OVER SAFETY DO NOT 
CREATE A DUTY BY A GENERAL CONTRACTOR TO A 
SUBCONTRACTOR. 
The next category of facts that Mrs. Begaye points to on appeal, safety measures, 
are indicia of Big-D's management of the construction project. They are similarly 
irrelevant to whether Big-D retained control over the manner and method of erecting Wall 
39. Such facts establish only that Big-D had a "general supervisory role" over safety, 
which is insufficient to create a duty toward a subcontractor's employee. Martinez, 2005 
WL 615106 at *2. 
a. Safety Provisions in the Owner Contract Are Irrelevant. 
Mrs. Begaye starts with the construction contract between Big-D and the project 
owner, which states that Big-D "shall take reasonable precautions for the safety of. . . 
employees on the work." (Appellant's Brief, p. 5). The contract further provided that 
Big-D was responsible to ensure subcontractor compliance with OSHA regulations. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 5). The fact that Big-D, the only contractor on the project who 
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directly contracted with the owner, assured the owner that the workplace would be safe, 
has nothing to do with control over Preferred's manner and method of erecting the wall. 
The court in Martens v. MCL Construction Corp., 807 N.E.2d 480 (111. App. 2004) 
recognized this distinction when it affirmed summary judgment for a general contractor 
who was contractually responsible for implementing a safety program that included citing 
subcontractors for rules violations and employing a safety director; while this indicated a 
general statement of control, "[w]e do not, however, equate those safety responsibilities 
with control over the means and methods of [the subcontractor's] steel erection work . . . ." 
Martens, 807 N.E.2d at 490. 
Like Mrs. Begaye, the plaintiff in Martinez had contended that the general 
contractor's agreement with the owner to be solely responsible for "all construction 
methods and for providing a safe work environment on the job site" meant the general 
contractor retained control over the work that caused his injury. The court rejected this 
argument, noting that the general contractor's subcontracts required the subcontractors to 
be responsible for jobsite safety. "Therefore, even if Defendant did have responsibility for 
safety vis-a-vis the owner, that responsibility was passed on to the various subcontractors." 
Martinez at **l-2. Big-D's subcontract with Preferred made Preferred "solely responsible 
for providing [its employees] with a safe workplace" and for complying with OSHA 
regulations applicable to its work. Preferred accepted this responsibility in the contract, 
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and its foreman acknowledged that it was his duty, not Big-D's, to keep his employees 
safe on the job. 
b. Big-D's Enforcement of Safety Regulation Is Irrelevant. 
Next, Mrs. Begaye contends that apart from contractual agreements, Big-D's actual 
enforcement of enforced safety regulations, from "interfering] with subcontractor work 
on more than 43 separate occasions" to making workers wear seat belts,1 makes it liable. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-6). The fact that Big-D instructed subcontractors to comply with 
safety standards and intervened when it observed subcontractors engaging in unsafe 
practices simply demonstrates that Big-D was a diligent and conscientious general 
contractor. It does not mean that Big-D interfered with the manner and method of erecting 
Wall 39. Merely ensuring that safety precautions are observed on a construction project 
does not create a duty. See Aguirre v. Turner Construction Co,, 2006 WL 644009 (N.D. 
111. 2006) (attached at Addendum A)(affirming summary judgment for the general 
contractor because "[enforcement of safety standards does not constitute control over the 
'incidental aspects' of subcontractor work.") Moreover, it does not make sense from a 
!She also claims that Big-D stopped work when subcontractors "filed to comply 
with OSHA bracing requirements." (Appellant's Brief, p. 6). The record cite she gives 
for this assertion is a page from her Opposition to Big-D's Motion for Summary 
judgment, where she notes that Big-D stopped plumbers from working in a trench that 
was not properly reinforced and refused a request by another subcontractor to work in a 
trench because the subcontractor "must follow OSHA guidelines." ( R. 515, 655). 
Neither of these instances has anything to do with bracing for a wall and does nothing to 
suggest that Big-D exerted control over Preferred's decision to brace Wall 39 on March 1, 
2004. 
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public policy standpoint to pin liability on a general contractor for the injury of a worker 
over whom they have no control because the contractor strives to create an injury-free 
workplace. Aguirre, 2006 WL 644009 at *5 ("penalizing a general contractor's efforts to 
promote safety and coordinate a general safety program among various independent 
contractors at a large jobsite hardly serves to advance the goal of work site safety.") 
(citation omitted). 
c. Big-D's Omissions Are Irrelevant. 
Mrs. Begaye additionally faults Big-D for what it did not do. Relying on testimony 
from her safety expert, Don Rigtrup, she maintains that Big-D should have reviewed 
OSHA and ANSI standards before Preferred worked on Wall 39, and that it should have 
performed a job hazard analysis because the erection of the wall was supposedly an 
unusually dangerous task.2 (Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-8). Mr. Rigtrup does not explain 
what OSHA or ANSI standards he is referring to or how review of them would have 
prevented the accident, and his opinion is too vague to be meaningful. Regarding the job 
site hazard analysis, Big-D's Request for Proposal to Preferred simply informs potential 
subcontractors that "[a]t Big-D's site superintendent's request, a job site hazard analysis 
2Mr. Rigtrup does not state that the failure to perform a job hazard analysis 
"directly led" to Mr. Begaye's death, contrary to Mrs. Begaye's representation. Instead, 
he claims that performing such an analysis "would have most probably prevented the 
overturning of the wall." (R. 761). This opinion is pure speculation without any basis in 
fact, and it is insufficient to create a meaningful factual issue. Thurston v. Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah, 83 P.3d 391, 397 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (expert opinion 
based on guesswork is inadmissible). 
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will be required to be submitted 24 hrs before any task, the superintendent considers 
necessary, is performed . . . ." (R. 812). No expert analysis is necessary to determine 
whether Big-D should have requested a job site hazard analysis because it was in Big-D's 
discretion to request it. Furthermore, Mr. Rigtrup offered no foundation to testify that 
Wall 39 was an "unusually dangerous task." He is not an expert on rebar walls and is no 
more qualified to testify about Wall 39 than any of the people who actually built the wall. 
In any event, Preferred foreman Mr. Jex emphasized that there was nothing unusual or 
dangerous about building Wall 39 or supporting it with bracing; "that's what we've done 
for years." 
Hindsight ruminations about what Big-D should have done that might have 
prevented the accident are irrelevant. They distract from the only issue pertinent to 
whether Big-D is liable for Mr. Begaye's death: whether Big-D affirmatively controlled 
the method or operative detail of Preferred's work in bracing Wall 39. As the court in 
Ruiz v. Herman Weissker, Inc., 130 Cal. App. 4th 52 (2005), observed, 
a hirer's failure to correct an unsafe practice of which it was aware, and that 
it retained the authority to correct, does not "affirmatively contribute" to the 
employee's injury and thus will not support the assertion of a claim against 
the hirer arising out of that injury. 
Ruiz, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 65. 
By contending that Big-D's ability to sequence work and monitor job safety should 
be considered on appeal, Mrs. Begaye is essentially asking this Court to ignore the relevant 
and intentionally narrow question of whether Big-D controlled the means by which 
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Preferred braced Wall 39. She wants to hold Big-D liable based on the necessary 
circumstance that Big-D, as the general contractor, had general responsibility for 
coordinating and overseeing the work of the subcontractors. 
If this Court were to abandon the reasoning in prior Utah cases and agree with 
Mrs. Begaye that Big-D is liable because of its status, it would hugely expand the scope of 
general contractors5 liability. It would render every general contractor liable not only for 
the general contractor's own employees, but also all the work of all subcontractors' 
employees, regardless of whether the general contractor had anything to do with the 
injury-causing aspect of the subcontractor's work. Employees of subcontractors would 
effectively become direct employees of general contractors. A general contractor could be 
liable if an employee of its subcontractor was injured in an accident due to failure to wear 
a seatbelt, regardless of whether the general contractor knew the employee was driving 
without a seatbelt. This would make the retained control doctrine all-encompassing 
rather than the narrow exception to non-liability it is meant to be. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Begaye has not presented any reason to reverse Judge Hilder's grant of 
summary judgment to Big-D. Big-D was not insinuating itself into Preferred's task of 
erecting Wall 39 on the day of the accident; instead, Preferred went about doing its work 
as it had before on that project, doing the job it was hired to do and knew how to do. 
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Big-D cannot be held responsible merely because it acted as a general contractor. 
Big-D requests that this Court affirm the trial court's decision. 
DATED this ( f l ^day of February, 2007. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
John R. Lund 
Julianne P. Blanch 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
*1 Plaintiff Russell Martinez appeals the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Defendant Jacobsen Construction Company, Inc. " 
Summary judgment is proper only when 'there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' " 
Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22,1 12, 979 P.2d 322 
(citation omitted). 
Plaintiff, a steelworker employed by a steel erection 
subcontractor, argues that the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant 
because material issues of fact exist as to whether 
Defendant, as the general contractor for the 
construction project, retained and exercised a right 
of control over worker safety sufficient to create a 
limited duty under the "retained control" doctrine. " 
[T]he issue of 'whether a "duty" exists is a matter 
of law' which we review for correctness." 
Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403, 
405 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted). 
"Utah adheres to the general common law rule that ' 
the employer of an independent contractor is not 
liable for physical harm caused to another by an act 
or omission of the contractor or his servants.' " 
Thompson, 1999 UT 22 at 1 13 (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409 (1965)). 
However, a narrow exception to this rule, the " 
retained control" doctrine, applies when "an 
employer of an independent contractor exercises 
enough control over the contracted work to give rise 
to a limited duty of care ... confined in scope to the 
control asserted." Id. a t l 15. 
We recently analyzed the "retained control" 
doctrine, stating that "under Thompson, retained 
control requires active participation in the method 
or operative detail of the injury-causing activity in 
order to impose liability." Smith v. Hales & 
Warner Constr., Inc., 2005 UT App 38,1 10, 518 
Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff first asserts that Defendant retained control 
via the contract between the owner of the 
construction project and Defendant in which 
Defendant agreed to be solely responsible for "all 
construction methods and for providing a safe work 
environment on the job site." In support of this 
proposition, Plaintiff cites language from 
Thompson: 
The term "retained control" may have a more 
syntactically correct application to sophisticated 
parties who, by contract, stipulate which party will 
control the manner or method of work or the safety 
measures to be taken-such as in contracts between 
general contractors and subcontractors involved in 
construction projects.... The issue, however, of 
whether a duty of care may be imposed solely as a 
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result of such a contractual reservation is not before 
us. 
1999UT22at(I26n.3. 
Plaintiffs reliance on this language is misplaced. In 
this case, Defendant subcontracted the steel work 
on the construction project to Masco, Inc., which 
subcontracted portions to Steel Deck Erectors, 
which, in turn, brought in Plaintiffs employer, 
Truco under a subcontract. The contract that 
Plaintiff refers to is only between Defendant and the 
owner of the project. Thus, it is doubtful that the 
Thompson footnote applies to this case. Instead, this 
case is similar to Smith, in which we found further 
support for refusing to apply the "retained control" 
doctrine to hold the owner liable to the deceased 
employee's relatives because "the actual supervisor 
of Decedent ... had a subcontract with [the rough 
carpentry subcontractor], which in turn was a 
subcontractor with the general contractor." 2005 
UTApp38atI l l . 
*2 Furthermore, it is undisputed that in all its 
subcontracts, Defendant required its subcontractors 
to be responsible for job site safety. The subcontract 
form was attached to and incorporated into the 
contract between Defendant and the project owner. 
Therefore, even if Defendant did have responsibility 
for safety vis-a-vis the owner, that responsibility 
was passed on to the various subcontractors. 
Plaintiff maintains, however, that there is more than 
a bare contractual reservation on which to base a 
duty in this case. Particularly, Plaintiff points to 
Defendant's directives to Steel Deck Erectors and 
Truco regarding fall protection, Defendant's safety 
inspections and checklists, Defendant's project 
manager's and superintendent's acknowledgment of 
responsibility to look for and correct dangerous 
working conditions, Defendant's monitoring of wind 
and weather, and Defendant's imposition of 
overtime. Though these factors, taken together, 
suggest a general supervisory role by Defendant, 
they do not rise to the level of control over the " 
method or operative detail of the injury-causing 
activity," id. at f 10, necessary to impose liability. 
Indeed, it is undisputed that Defendant did not train 
Plaintiff and other steel workers on how to do their 
jobs. In particular, Defendant did not supervise or 
train Plaintiff and other steel workers on how to 
install the tie-off system. Rather, Defendant simply 
required its subcontractors to perform their work 
safely and in compliance with the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration requirements. " 
This amounted merely to control over the desired 
result, which is insufficient to come within the 
retained control doctrine." Thompson, 1999 UT 22 
at 5 24. 
In sum, because Defendant did not actively 
participate in the steel work itself, or the safety 
system for the steel work, Defendant's participation 
is insufficient to create a duty under the "retained 
control" doctrine under Utah law.FN1 
FN1. Plaintiff also argues that if Defendant 
owes Plaintiff a duty of care, summary 
judgment was improper because material 
issues of fact exist as to whether Defendant 
breached this duty and whether such 
breach is a proximate cause of Plaintiffs 
injuries. However, because we determine 
that no duty of care exists in this case, we 
do not reach these issues. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is 
affirmed. 
I CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Associate 
Presiding Judge. 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: GREGORY K. 
ORME, Judge. 
UtahApp.,2005. 
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Jose Antonio AGUIRRE, et al. Plaintiffs, 
v. 
TURNER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, et al. 
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No. Civ.A. 05 C 515. 
March 9,2006. 
Milo W. Lundblad, Charles E. Webster, Glen 
Joseph Dunn, Jr., Marvin A. Brustin, Marvin A. 
Brustin, Ltd., Chicago, II, Jennifer Marie Hill, 
Worth, EL, for Plaintiffs. 
Jenna Lynn Schoeneman, Bryon D. Knight, 
Matthew Scott Clark, Knight, Hoppe, Kurnik & 
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Ruksakiati, Steven C Swanson, Fisher Kanaris, 
P.C., Chicago, IL, for Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
CONLON, J. 
*1 Plaintiff Jose Antonio Aguirre was injured while 
working as a bricklayer during the renovation of 
Soldier Field when he fell from a scaffold. He and 
his wife Maria Aguirre filed a fourteen-count 
personal injury and loss of consortium complaint 
against contractors involved in the renovation 
project. All but two of those defendants were 
dismissed from the case. Dkt.20, 36. The remaining 
defendants are the construction manager for the 
project, TBMK, a joint venture, comprised of 
Turner Construction Company, Barton-Malow 
Company, and Kenny Construction, as well as 
Chicago Bears Stadium, Inc. Before the court are 
the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. 
FACTS 
The facts material to summary judgment are 
undisputed unless otherwise noted. TBMK was the 
construction manager of the Soldier Field 
renovation project. TBMK's contract with the 
developer required TBMK to "take all necessary 
precautions and institute programs necessary to 
ensure the safety of the public and of workers 
performing the Work on the job, and to prevent 
accidents or injury to persons on the Site. 
Construction Manager shall comply with all Legal 
Requirements relative to safety and the prevention 
of accidents." Pl.Ex. E. The contract required 
TBMK to appoint a safety superintendent to 
oversee safety on the project. 
In furtherance of its obligations, TBMK 
promulgated an extensive safety program. All 
subcontractors were "solely responsible for the 
safety of their employees" and the "training] and 
education of] their employees" concerning the 
safety program. Def. Exh. R. TBMK employed a 
contractor project safety coordinator and other 
personnel who oversaw safety on the project. 
Specifically, the safety coordinator assisted 
subcontractors in preparing their site safety 
programs, held monthly safety meetings, audited 
safety on the project and had the authority to stop 
work if he detected unsafe conditions. Id. TBMK's 
safety personnel walked the work site daily to 
evaluate compliance with the safety program. 
However, the program provided that "[t]he 
assignment of construction management or 
insurance safety personnel to monitor 
responsibilities for safety is not intended to relieve 
the contractor [sic] of their responsibility for 
providing a safe and healthy environment for their 
employees." Id. TBMK was empowered to stop 
work for safety reasons, authority which it 
sometimes exercised. TBMK could also fine or 
dismiss subcontractors or subcontractor employees 
for safety violations. Id. Subcontractors were 
required to make daily safety inspections of the job 
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site and ensure that all subcontractor employees 
followed TBMK's safety program. Subcontractors 
were required to document weekly safety meetings 
concerning topics provided by TBMK. 
TBMK contracted with A.L.L. Masonry to 
complete masonry work during the renovation. 
A.L.L. was required to "perform and furnish all the 
work, labor, services, materials, plant, equipment, 
tools, scaffolds, appliances and other things 
necessary for" the work. Def. Ex. P. A.L.L. " 
agree[d] that the prevention of accidents to 
workmen and property engaged upon or in the 
vicinity of the Work is its responsibility." Id. A.L.L. 
prepared and executed a site-specific safety 
program and employed a project manager to 
oversee the project and administer the safety 
program. Def. Ex. Q.A.L.L. employed two 
additional full-time safety personnel to ensure that it 
complied with the safety program. 
*2 A.L.L. was required to build, inspect, and 
approve scaffolding for use by its employees. 
A.L.L. was required to follow 23 rules for scaffold 
construction promulgated by TBMK, including the 
use of fall protection for workers more than six feet 
off the ground. TBMK could require A.L.L. to 
correct deficiencies it observed in A.L.L.'s 
scaffolding. TBMK was not required to inspect all 
of the scaffolding, but did do so. TBMK imposed 
specific design requirements on the scaffold where 
Aguirre fell because the design required deviation 
from TBMK's general requirements. 
Aguirre was employed by A.L.L. as a bricklayer 
during the Soldier Field renovation. At the time of 
the accident, Aguirre was laying bricks around 
garage-style doors on the north end of the field. 
Aguirre fell from a scaffold around one of the doors 
to the concrete eight to ten feet below when the foot 
planks supporting him gave way or flipped. The 
scaffold was completed and stocked with bricks and 
mortar earlier that morning by A.L.L. employees. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Legal Standard 
Page 2 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, each 
movant must satisfy the requirements of Rule 56. 
Clipco, Ltd. v. Ignite Design, LLC, No. 04 C 5043, 
2005 WL 1838436, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Aug.l, 2005) 
(Conlon, J.). Summary judgment is appropriate 
when the moving papers and affidavits show there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 
(1986). Once a moving party meets its burden, the 
non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings 
and set forth specific facts showing there is a 
genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Silk v. 
City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir.1999). 
The court considers the record as a whole and 
draws all reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion. Bay v. 
Cassens Transport Co., 212 F.3d 969, 972 (7th 
Cir.2000). A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., Ml U.S. 242, 248, 
106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 
n. Chicago Bears Stadium 
Aguirre asserts six claims against Chicago Bears 
Stadium: negligence (Count V); loss of consortium 
based on negligence (Count VI); res ipsa loquitur 
(Count IX); loss of consortium based on res ipsa 
loquitur (Count X); premises liability (Count XI); 
and loss of consortium based on premises liability 
(Count XII). Chicago Bears Stadium moves for 
summary judgment on all counts. Aguirre does not 
contest the motion. Therefore, summary judgment 
shall be entered for Chicago Bears Stadium and 
against Aguirre on Counts V, VI, IX, X, XI, and 
XII. Walker v. McKee, No. 93 C 5962, 1997 WL 
182288, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Apr.9, 1997) (Moran, J.). 
HI. TBMK 
Aguirre asserts four claims against TBMK: 
negligence (Count 1); loss of consortium based on 
negligence (Count II); res ipsa loquitur (Count IX); 
and loss of consortium based on res ipsa loquitur 
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(Count X). TBMK moves for summary judgment on 
all counts. 
A. Res Ipsa Loquitur 
*3 Counts IX and X assert claims based on res ipsa 
loquitur. In Illinois, "[t]he purpose of the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur 'is to allow proof of negligence 
by circumstantial evidence when the direct evidence 
concerning cause of injury is primarily within the 
knowledge and control of the defendant." ' 
Kolakowski v. Voris, 83 I11.2d 388, 47 Ill.Dec. 392, 
415 N.E.2d 397, 400 (HI. 1970). A plaintiff must 
prove two elements in order to establish an 
inference of negligence under res ipsa loquitur: (1) 
the injury ordinarily does not occur absent 
negligence; and (2) the instrumentality of the injury 
was within the defendant's exclusive control. Gatlin 
v. Ruder, 137 I11.2d 284, 148 Ill.Dec. 188, 560 
N.E.2d 586, 590 (111.1986). TBMK argues that res 
ipsa loquitur should not apply because it never had 
control over the scaffold that caused Aguirre's 
injury. The court agrees. Aguirre argues that the 
floor boards on the scaffold gave way because it 
was negligently erected. It is undisputed that A.L.L. 
owned the scaffold and finished erecting and 
stocking the scaffold earlier on the morning of the 
accident. Aguirre fell from the scaffold soon after it 
was completed. TBMK contributed nothing to 
assembly of the scaffold and never had control over 
it. TBMK's summary judgment motion on Counts 
IX and X must be granted. 
B. Restatement of Torts Section 414 
The parties agree that the negligence claim asserted 
by Aguirre is governed by Section 414 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 414 
provides: "[o]ne who entrusts work to an 
independent contractor, but who retains the control 
of any part of the work, is subject to liability for 
physical harm to others for whose safety the 
employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, 
which is caused by his failure to exercise his control 
with reasonable care." Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 414 (1965). The comments to Section 414 
reveal that some degree of control is necessary for 
the section to apply. Comment (a) discusses the 
amount of control that may be maintained without 
incurring liability: 
The employer may, however, retain a control less 
than that which is necessary to subject him to 
liability as master. He may retain only the power to 
direct the order in which the work shall be done, or 
to forbid its being done in a manner likely to be 
dangerous to himself or others. 
Id. § 414 cmt. a. Comment b applies to a general 
contractor that:entrusts a part of the work to 
subcontractors, but himself or through a foreman 
superintends the entire job. In such a situation, the 
principal contractor is subject to liability if he fails 
to prevent the subcontractors from doing even the 
details of the work in a way unreasonably 
dangerous to others, if he knows or by the exercise 
of reasonable care should know that the 
subcontractors' work is being so done, and has the 
opportunity to prevent it by exercising the power of 
control which he has retained in himself. 
Id. § 414 cmt. b. Comment c limits the application 
of section 414:*4 In order for the rule stated in this 
Section to apply, the employer must have retained 
at least some degree of control over the manner in 
which the work is done. It is not enough that he has 
merely a general right to order the work stopped or 
resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive 
reports, to make suggestions or recommendations 
which need not necessarily be followed, or to 
prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general 
right is usually reserved to employers, but it does 
not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his 
methods of work, or as to operative detail. There 
must be such a retention of a right of supervision 
that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work 
in his own way. 
Id. § 414 cmt. c. It is a factual issue whether a 
general contractor retained sufficient control to give 
rise to a duty of care. Schreiber v. Idea Eng'g & 
Fabricating, No. 99 C 6509, 2003 WL 220971491, 
at *2 (N.D.I11. Sept. 5, 2003) (Moran, J.), affd 117 
Fed. Appx. 467 (7th Cir.2004) (unpublished). The 
question of control should be resolved on summary 
judgment where the evidence presented is 
insufficient to give rise to a factual issue. 
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Aguirre argues that TBMK's extensive safety 
program indicates sufficient control to impose a 
duty on TBMK, citing Bokodi v. Foster Wheeler, 
312 Ill.App.3d 1051, 245 Ill.Dec. 644, 728 N.E.2d 
726 (1st Dist.2000). In Bokodi, the plaintiff, a 
subcontractor employee, was injured while 
installing metal siding. The general contractor 
imposed a detailed safety program, which the 
plaintiff claimed established a duty on the general 
contractor. Id. at 728. The safety plan included 
weekly safety meetings and 29 specific guidelines 
that each subcontractor had to follow. Id. at 735. 
The general contractor also employed a project 
safety manager who inspected the job site to ensure 
compliance with the program and held weekly 
safety meetings. Id. Any employee of the general 
contractor was authorized to stop a subcontractor's 
work if it did not comply with the program. Id. The 
Bokodi court agreed with the plaintiff, holding that 
the pervasive safety program and enforcement by 
the general contractor indicated "that defendants 
retained control over the operative details of the 
work, superintended the entire job, and retained a 
right of supervision such that the subcontractors 
were not entirely free to do their work in their own 
way." Id. at 736. 
Bokodi does not apply here because it is 
distinguishable on the facts. The safety program in 
Bokodi is similar to TBMK's safety program. They 
both included specific guidelines to be followed by 
subcontractors and provided a substantial 
enforcement mechanism for the general contractor. 
However, the contract in this case is distinguishable 
from the contract in Bokodi. The Bokodi court 
noted that the contract provided subcontractors 
would be in control of the operative details of their 
work. Id. at 735. In contravention to that provision, 
the general contractor "went to great lengths to 
enforce the safety standards at the work site." Id. 
The court did not cite any contractual provision that 
required the subcontractor to control safety. Here, 
the contract between TBMK and A.L.L. provided 
that A.L.L. controlled operative work details. The 
contract also provided that A.L.L. controlled its 
workers' safety. A.L.L. was contractually required 
to comply with TBMK's safety program, design its 
own safety program tailored to TBMK's safety 
standards, and employ personnel to ensure 
compliance. Because A.L.L. was in control of its 
own safety by contract, Bokodi is inapposite. 
*5 TBMK points out that the rule in Bokodi is not 
applied consistently by Illinois courts: 
[E]ven where the employer or general contractor 
retains the right to inspect the work done, order 
changes to the specifications and plans, and ensures 
that safety precautions are observed and the work 
is done in a safe manner, no liability will be 
imposed on the employer or general contractor 
unless the evidence shows the employer or general 
contractor retained control over the "incidental 
aspects" of the independent contractor's work. 
Rangel v. Brookhaven Constructors, Inc., 307 
Ill.App.3d 835, 241 Ill.Dec. 313, 719 N.E.2d 174, 
178 (1st Dist.1999) (emphasis added). Enforcement 
of safety standards does not constitute control over 
the "incidental aspects" of subcontractor work. See, 
e.g., Martens v. MCL Constr. Corp., 347 Ill.App.3d 
303, 282 Ill.Dec. 856, 807 N.E.2d 480, 490 (1st 
Dist.2004) (general contractor's broad safety 
program with enforcement mechanism did not 
constitute control over means and methods of 
subcontractor's work); Ross v. Dae Julie, Inc., 341 
Ill.App.3d 1065, 275 Ill.Dec. 588, 793 N.E.2d 68, 
72 (1st Dist.2003) (citing Rangel ); Beiruta v. Klein 
Creek Corp., 331 Ill.App.3d 269, 264 Ill.Dec. 479, 
770 N.E.2d 1175, 1182 (1st Dist 2002) (same); Fris 
v. Pers. Prods. Co., 255 Ill.App.3d 916, 194 
Ill.Dec. 623, 627 N.E.2d 1265, 1272 (3d Dist. 1994) 
(enforcing safety does not constitute control). These 
cases are more persuasive that Bokodi because " 
[penalizing a general contractor's efforts to 
promote safety and coordinate a general safety 
program among various independent contractors at 
a large jobsite hardly serves to advance the goal of 
work site safety." Martens, 282 Ill.Dec. 856, 807 
N.E.2dat492. 
TBMK had no duty of care with respect to Aguirre 
because it did not have control over the incidental 
details of A.L.L.'s work or its workers' safety. 
TBMK merely "ensure[d] that safety precautions 
[were] observed and the work [was] done in a safe 
manner" in compliance with its standards and 
A.L.L.'s contractually required safety plan. Rangel, 
241 Ill.Dec. 313, 719 N.E.2d at 178. This is not 
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enough to establish the requisite control under § 414 
. Judgement must therefore be granted to TBMK on 
Counts I and II. 
This result is buttressed by decisions by other 
judges of this court. "The mere retention of a 
general right to inspect the work, to order it stopped 
or resumed, to make suggestions or 
recommendations or prescribe alterations or 
deviations, or to enforce safety regulations, has 
been held insufficient" to constitute control over 
subcontractor work. Idea Eng'g, 2003 WL 
22071491, at *2 (Moran, J.), affd, 117 Fed. Appx. 
467. In Idea, the general contractor required the 
subcontractor to obey its safety standards. Id. at *2. 
The general contractor also employed two safety 
supervisors to inspect subcontractor work, hold 
weekly safety meetings, and stop subcontractor 
work for failure to comply with safety standards. Id. 
These facts were insufficient to create a duty for the 
general contractor under § 414. This case is 
analogous. See also Pierce v. Chicago Rail Link, 
LLC, No. 03 C 7524, 2005 WL 599980, at *15 
(N.D.IU. Mar. 15, 2005) (Kennelly, J.) ("[t]he ability 
to enforce safety regulations ... does not constitute 
control"); Taylor v. Facility Constructors, Inc., 360 
F.Supp.2d 887, 893 (N.DJ11.2005) (Shadur, J.) 
(citing Rangel ); Dailey, 2002 WL 31101672, at *3 
(enforcing safety regulations does not constitute 
control over operative details of subcontractor 
work). Because TBMK owed Aguirre no duty, 
TBMK's argument that Aguirre's expert testimony 
should be disregarded need not be reached. 
CONCLUSION 
*6 Aguirre concedes that Chicago Bears Stadium is 
entitled to summary judgment. TBMK owed no 
duty to Aguirre because it did not retain sufficient 
control over the incidental aspects of A.L.L.'s work. 
Therefore, defendants' summary judgement motions 
are granted, and Aguirre's cross-motion for 
summary judgment is denied. 
N.D.I11.,2006. 
Aguirre v. Turner Const. Co. 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 644009 
(N.D.I11.) 
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